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Abstract The science of event attribution meets a mounting demand for reliable and timely
information about the links between climate change and individual extreme events. Studies
have estimated the contribution of human-induced climate change to the magnitude of an event
as well as its likelihood, and many types of event have been investigated including heatwaves,
floods, and droughts. Despite this progress, such approaches have been criticised for being
unreliable and for being overly conservative. We argue that such criticisms are misplaced.
Rather, a false dichotomy has arisen between Bconventional^ approaches and new alternative
framings. We have three points to make about the choice of statistical paradigm for event
attribution studies. First, different approaches to event attribution may choose to occupy
different places on the conditioning spectrum. Providing this choice of conditioning is
communicated clearly, the value of such choices depends ultimately on their utility to the user
concerned. Second, event attribution is an estimation problem for which either frequentist or
Bayesian paradigms can be used. Third, for hypothesis testing, the choice of null hypothesis is
context specific. Thus, the null hypothesis of human influence is not inherently a preferable
alternative to the usual null hypothesis of no human influence.
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1 Introduction
Allen (2003) first proposed the concept of attributing individual extreme weather events, using
a paradigm in which attribution is based on estimates of the extent to which human-induced
climate change has increased or decreased the likelihood of an event such as a heatwave or
flood. The first application of the concept was an attribution of causes of the extreme European
summer temperatures of 2003 (Stott et al. 2004). This study showed that it was very likely
(greater than 90% chance) that human-induced climate change had more than doubled the
likelihood of occurrence of such extreme temperatures.
Research on event attribution has subsequently flourished, responding to a mounting
demand for reliable and timely information about the links between climate change and
individual extreme events. Although we will focus on the likelihood of events in this article,
many studies have also estimated the contribution of human-induced climate change to the
magnitude of an event, as well as to its likelihood. In many cases, the magnitude of the event is
likely to be more strongly affected by natural variability than its likelihood. For example, the
likelihood of the Russian heatwave of 2010 was found to have increased substantially with
global warming (Rahmstorf and Coumou 2011) while its magnitude was found to be mainly
natural in origin (Dole et al. 2011). These different results reflect the different ways of framing
the attribution question (Otto et al. 2012) and illustrate that it is worth considering both
likelihood and magnitude in event attribution.
Many types of events in many regions have now been investigated. Human-induced climate
change is estimated to have increased the likelihood of the Australian record summer temper-
ature of 2013 (Lewis and Karoly 2013), to have contributed to flood risk that led to the
devastating inundations in England and Wales in Autumn 2000 (Pall et al. 2011), and to have
increased the chances of the record low Arctic sea ice extent seen in 2012 (Kirchmeier-Young
et al. 2017). Annual reports in the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society assess the
extent to which anthropogenic climate change has affected the strength and likelihood of
recent individual extreme events. Human-induced climate change has increased the intensity or
likelihood of almost all the heat-related events examined, and has affected many other events
including tropical cyclones, forest fires, and cold events.
As a result of such work, the value of event attribution is now becoming clear. Stakeholders
from different sectors (insurance, policy making, media, legal) have a variety of different uses
for such information (Stott et al. 2016). The US National Academy of Sciences recently
assessed the validity of event attribution (NAS 2016) and concluded that Bit is now often
possible to make and defend quantitative statements about the extent to which human-induced
climate change (or another causal factor, such as a specific mode of natural variability) has
influenced either the magnitude or the probability of occurrence of specific types of event or
event classes.^ The report noted that event attribution science Bhas advanced a great deal in
recent years and is still evolving rapidly.^ This was due to two main reasons: Bone, the
understanding of the climate and weather mechanisms that produce extreme events is improv-
ing, and two, rapid progress is being made in the methods that are used for event attribution.^
Despite this progress, the approaches described above have been criticised for being flawed
in two basic respects (Trenberth et al. 2015; Mann et al. 2017). First, it is argued that the
reliance of event attribution studies on climate models makes standard approaches unreliable
(Trenberth et al. 2015). Instead, it is argued, attribution studies should consider how anthro-
pogenic climate change has altered the effects of extreme weather events, while considering
the meteorological structure of the event, such as the state of the atmospheric circulation, as
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being fixed. For example, global warming may have increased the quantity of snow falling in
the Bsnowmaggeden^ storm in the Eastern United States in February, 2010 (Trenberth et al.
2015). In such a storyline approach (Shepherd 2016), rather than trying to estimate how the
overall likelihood of such a snowstorm may have been altered by climate change, it is
suggested that the state of the atmospheric circulation that produced the storm should be
considered as a given and that the impact of climate change on the amount of snow delivered
by the storm should be estimated. While understanding how the overall risks of extreme events
are changing requires both a thermodynamic perspective and an understanding of changes in
atmospheric circulation (Otto et al. 2016), the counter argument is that this alternative storyline
approach may be less prone to error because it does not depend on a climate model’s ability to
simulate variability and change in atmospheric circulation (Trenberth et al. 2015; Shepherd
2016).
The second flaw, it is argued, is that standard event attribution approaches require signif-
icance testing in which the null hypothesis of no human influence must first be ruled out at a
sufficiently high significance level (typically 5%) (Trenberth et al. 2015; Mann et al. 2017).
Mann et al. 2017 (see also Trenberth et al. 2015) suggest that such a testing-based approach is
Bconservative^ and argue that an approach in which event likelihoods are estimated via
Bayesian methods would be better both empirically and ethically.
In this article, we argue that a false dichotomy has arisen between Bconventional^
approaches and new alternative approaches. All attribution studies depend on certain condi-
tions remaining equal between the factual and counter-factual worlds being compared. The
storyline approach is a special case of such conditioning. We do not accept that Bayesian
approaches to event attribution are inherently more accurate than frequentist approaches. There
is no evidence to suggest that Bconventional^ approaches are inherently biased either towards
anthropogenic influence or against.
2 Conditioning in event attribution
The original formulation of Allen (2003) is to compare the probability of an event today (P1)
with the probability of the event in the counterfactual conditions (P0) under which a particular
driver of climate, such as human influence, is missing. This allows calculation of the fraction
of attributable risk (1−P0/P1 = (P1−P0)/P1) or risk ratio (P1/P0). A quadrupling of the risk
ratio equates to a FAR equal to 0.75.
Calculating P0 and P1 requires estimating the probability of an event in two different
conditions, all other things being equal. For example, in many attribution studies, the same
solar and volcanic forcings on climate are included in both factual (P1) and counterfactual (P0)
conditions to ensure that differences between P1 and P0 reflect only the additional impact of
human influence. A climate model is required for both P0, because these are counterfactual
conditions that have not existed in reality, and for P1, because we live in a non-stationary
climate that makes estimates inappropriate when based on observational information under the
assumption of stationarity. While statistical models based on observations are sometimes used,
studies predominately estimate these probabilities from dynamical climate models. Climate
model evaluation is critical in both cases since if a model fails to capture features salient to
calculating these two probabilities, its estimate of attributable risk will be in error.
The challenge of model evaluation has been taken up by the event attribution community
since an understanding of the fidelity of models is an important component in evaluating and
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communicating confidence in event attribution results (Stott et al. 2016; Bellprat and Doblas-
Reyes 2016; Lott and Stott 2016). Climate models are not perfect but the relevant question for
any application is whether they are fit for purpose. To take an example, a recent evaluation of
the HadGEM3-A model being used for event attribution has shown the model has a good
representation of circulation characteristics relevant to European extreme events such as
heatwaves and droughts when run at seasonal forecast resolution (Vautard et al. 2017). Such
evaluation of model performance helps assess confidence in a model-based assessment of
changing risk (Stott et al. 2016).
All event attribution studies calculate the effects of a causal factor or factors while
controlling for the effects of other factors. The analysis of European seasonal temperatures
in 2003 by Stott et al. (2004) compared simulations of European temperatures with and
without anthropogenic climate change while assuming that other factors, such as natural
forcings, were the same. More stringent conditions can be imposed. For example, uncoupled
atmosphere only climate models can be used to evaluate the odds of a particular event with and
without anthropogenic forcing under the pattern of sea surface temperatures (SST) observed at
the time of the event (e.g. Pall et al. 2011). These odds therefore become SST-pattern
dependent. This allows, for example, an assessment of how anthropogenic influence changed
the probability of Australian extreme rainfall in 2010/2011 under the La Niña conditions that
prevailed at the time (Christidis et al. 2013; King et al. 2013). Even more stringent conditions
can be imposed by evaluating the change in probability of an event given specific aspects of
the circulation. This allows, for example, an assessment of how anthropogenic influence
changed the probability of a Western European cold surge during north-easterly flow in
2009/2010 (Cattiaux et al. 2010).
An event attribution assessment becomes closer to that of the storyline approach (Trenberth
et al. 2015; Shepherd 2016) as the degree of conditioning becomes increasingly stringent.
When we talk of an event in the attribution context, we are actually referring to a class of
events that satisfy a specific criterion, such as the exceedance of a particular temperature or
precipitation threshold. This is also true of the storyline approach even if in this case the class
of event is much more closely tied to the observed evolution of the event, such as its synoptic
evolution. Risk-based approaches to event attribution and the storyline approach differ pri-
marily in occupying different places on this conditioning spectrum. They both depend on
climate models of some sort to estimate the appropriate counterfactual since the counterfactual
is fundamentally unobservable. Potentially, they both have value. Ultimately, such a value
depends on the utility of the information derived for the users interested in exploiting it.
3 Frequentist versus Bayesian approaches to event attribution
Event attribution is fundamentally an estimation problem in which the probabilities of an event
in the factual and counterfactual worlds (P1, P0, respectively) are calculated from models,
either statistical or climatological, under the two alternative situations. Frequentist and Bayes-
ian approaches are different ways of tackling this estimation problem.
Frequentists estimate probabilities conventionally, often by maximizing the likelihood
function or seeking estimates with other desirable properties such as unbiasedness or minimum
variance under repeated sampling (e.g. Cox and Hinkley 1974). Bayesians proceed similarly,
except they calculate a posterior likelihood function, which is a convolution between the
likelihood function and a prior distribution based on Bayes theorem that summarizes
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information about P0 and P1 that might have been available prior to conducting the analysis. A
philosophical distinction is that probability distributions are used to describe uncertainty in P0
and P1, whereas frequentists consider only the variation in the estimates of P0 and P1 that
would have occurred under repeated sampling of the observed system.
A potential criticism of Bayesian approaches is that the choice of prior distribution can
strongly influence the posterior distribution, which creates a source of uncertainty that may be
difficult to evaluate (e.g. Gelman 2008). This could lead to a large bias in the estimation of the
human influence on some extreme events if the posterior distribution is unduly influenced by a
strong prior belief in a human-induced effect, or the lack of a human-induced effect. Overes-
timation could lead to poor adaptation decisions by, for example, investing in infrastructure to
protect against an increased frequency of events that are not in reality being made more likely
by human-induced climate change. Conversely, underestimation could lead to a failure to
make needed investments.
4 The role of hypothesis testing
It is often supposed (e.g. Trenberth et al. 2015; Mann et al. 2017) that frequentist approaches to
event attribution require the null hypothesis of no human influence to be tested before an
attribution result is reported. Rather, as pointed out above, event attribution is primarily an
estimation problem—that of estimating the probabilities P1 and P0. In making this supposi-
tion, a criticism of frequentist approaches to event attribution is that they do not exploit prior
information that there is high confidence in a dominant human-induced component to global
warming. Additionally, the suggestion is made that this leads to a conservative bias, which is
claimed to be favoured by scientists who are keen to protect their reputations and fearful of
their results being discredited.
Mann et al. (2017) introduce a medical analogy in their criticism of frequentist approaches,
arguing that climate scientists should seek to disprove the null hypothesis that human-induced
climate change has made a particular extreme event worse or more likely, just as pharmaceu-
tical companies have to disprove the null hypothesis that drugs do harm. But any such choice
needs to be made with a clear-sighted appreciation of its impact on the relevant benefit/loss
function. This will be different for different users of the information.
In medicine, the interests of the patient may be different from that of the medical
practitioner, or society as a whole. For climate change, an assumption that anthropogenic
climate change influenced a particular event in the absence of any further evidence may be
appropriate for some international policy makers (where there is strong evidence that such
extreme events globally are being affected) but not for regional planners for whom the local
specifics of the event are relevant to whether adaptation measures are appropriate.
Ultimately, the question of ethics needs to be addressed by considering the differing interests
of different users of event attribution findings and the nature of the decision-making framework
that will use event attribution results. If climate change adaptation is still largely a matter of
individual actors making local and regional decisions in the face of scarce adaptation resources,
then they might expect to be asked to demonstrate that P1 is significantly greater than P0. On
the other hand, if it has been decided at a global (or national) political level that the greater good
dictates that adaptation will be undertaken, then we might expect to see provisions that will
allow local or regional authorities to opt out under some circumstances. One of those circum-
stances might involve having to demonstrate that P1 is not significantly greater than P0.
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Regarding ethics, whether these questions are addressed with Bayesian or frequentist
methods is a secondary consideration (either approach can be used for both null hypotheses).
The choice of approach should focus primarily on the method that is most appropriate for the
inference problem at hand. In instances where the prior is not controversial, a Bayesian method
may be preferable from both an estimation and testing perspective. But in other instances
where the prior is highly contentious, a Bayesian approach may have little relevance except in
those cases where the available evidence overwhelms the choice of prior.
An important point to consider in event attribution is the potentially limited relevance of
prior information about the causes of global climate change to the regional event attribution
problem. While it is generally accepted that a warmer atmosphere will lead to higher
atmospheric moisture content and heavier extreme precipitation globally, there are a number
of locations where a prior belief that this expectation applies locally could lead to an incorrect
conclusion about anthropogenic influence on climate events at regional scales. Some specific
examples include projected declines in extreme rainfall in the parts of the sub-tropics associ-
ated with tropical circulation changes (Kharin et al. 2013; Pfahl et al. 2017), observed winter
rainfall in the southwest of Australia, which is already showing significant declines due to
climate change (Delworth and Zeng 2014), record low October rainfall in October 2015 in
Tasmania, Australia (Karoly et al. 2016), and recent unexpected increases in frost risk in some
parts of southern Australia (Dittus et al. 2014).
In such cases, such prior expectations might lead to an inappropriate rejection of the
alternative null hypothesis proposed by Mann et al. (2017), namely that there is an anthropo-
genic influence on the event in question. For example, southwest Australian winter rainfall has
decreased rather than increased as prior expectations based only on global thermodynamic
considerations would suggest. Thus, replacing the null hypothesis of no human influence with
its opposite, as suggested by Mann et al. (2017), would not necessarily improve the reliability
of hypothesis testing.
The question of ethics and its relation to the question about how to formulate the null
hypothesis for testing is not fundamentally a question of a choice between Bayesian and
frequentist approaches. Instead, whether posed in a Bayesian or frequentist manner, we return
to the point that event attribution problem is an estimation problem. Given that changes locally
can be very different to global expectations, as a result for example of dynamically induced
changes over-coming thermodynamically induced ones, great care must be taken in using prior
expectations derived from global considerations. In some cases, the inappropriate use of such
prior information could reach too liberal conclusions. In other cases, the neglect of relevant
prior information could lead to overly conservative conclusions.
5 Conclusion
In summary, we have three points to make about the choice of statistical paradigm for event
attribution studies. First, different approaches to event attribution may choose to occupy
different places on the conditioning spectrum. Providing this choice of conditioning is
communicated clearly, the value of such choices depends ultimately on their utility to the user
concerned. Second, event attribution is an estimation problem for which either frequentist or
Bayesian paradigms can be used. Third, for hypothesis testing, the choice of null hypothesis is
context specific. Thus, the null hypothesis of human influence is not inherently a preferable
alternative to the usual null hypothesis of no human influence.
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Finally, we make a remark about ethical practice as it relates to event attribution. Ethical
practice should include such considerations as being clear about methods and assumptions
(including priors), rigorously assessing tools and uncertainties, and being clear on which
hypotheses are being tested and why a particular testing formulation is suitable for the
circumstances being considered. This view of what constitutes ethical practice for a practi-
tioner should not be controversial and should be kept distinct from considerations of what
constitutes ethical practice for policy makers, business leaders, and politicians.
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